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Summary 
This paper analyzes the effect of spillovers and congestion of local public goods on the 
segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction. Households living in the 
same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local public good, that creates positive 
spillovers in other jurisdictions and suffers from congestion. In every jurisdiction, the 
production of the local public good is financed through a local tax on household's wealth. 
Local wealth tax rates are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households also 
consume housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for 
another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition to have every 
stable jurisdiction structure segregated by wealth, for a large class of congestion measure 
and any spillovers coefficient structure, is identified: the public good must be a gross 
substitute or a gross complement to the private good and the housing. 
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This paper analyzes the eect of spillovers and congestion of local public
goods on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction.
Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local
public good, that creates positive spillovers in other jurisdictions and suers
from congestion. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public good
is nanced through a local tax on household's wealth. Local wealth tax rates
are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households also consume
housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for
another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and sucient condition
to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by wealth, for a large class
of congestion measure and any spillovers coecient structure, is identied: the
public good must be a gross substitute or a gross complement to the private
good and the housing.
JEL Classication: C78; D02; H73; R13
Keywords: Jurisdictions; Segregation; Spillovers; Congestion
1 Introduction
In most countries, local public spending accounts for a large share of the public spend-
ing (almost 50% in the USA), and this share is increasing since the end of the Second
World War. As a consequence of the growing role played by local jurisdictions, an-
other phenomenon appeared: jurisdictions belonging to the same urban area seem to
be more dierenciated in terms of their inhabitants' wealth. One reason for this can
be explained by Tiebout's 1956 article. In his intuitions, he claims that individuals, by
choosing their place of residence according to a trade-o between local tax rates and
amounts of public good provided, leads every jurisdiction to be homogenous. The for-
mation of jurisdictions structure is endogenous, due to the free mobility of households,
that can vote with their feet , that is to say leave their jurisdiction to another one,
if they are unsatised with their jurisdiction's tax rate and amount of public good.
There exists a wide literature dealing with the endogenous jurisdiction formation a
I'm indebted to Antonio Accetturo, Pierre-Philippe Combes, and Nicolas Gravel for their very
helpful comments and suggestions.
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1la Tiebout. A widely spread belief is the self-sorting mecanism of the endogenous
formation process: agents will live in homogenous jurisdiction. This homogeneity can
be expressed in terms of wealth, preferences on public good, on housing, on economic
activity...
Westho (1977) was among the rst economists to provide a formal model based on
Tiebout's intuitions. In this model, households can enjoy 2 goods, a local public good,
nanced through a local tax on wealth, which is a pure club good (only households
living in the jurisdiction that produced it can enjoy it), and a composite private good,
whose amount is equal to the after-tax wealth. He found a condition that ensures
both the existence of an equilibrium, and at the equilibrium, the jurisdiction structure
will be wealth-stratied. The condition to ensure the existence of an equilibrium is
to have the slope of individuals' indierence curve in the tax rate-amount of public
good plan to be ordered by their private wealth. If this condition holds, not only an
equilibrium will exist, but at equilibrium, the jurisdiction structure will be segregated.
Rose-Ackerman (1979) proposed a model a la Westho, but improved it with the
introduction of a competitive land market and taxation on housing, and raised the
diculty of reaching an equilibrium, because preferences are not necessary single-
peaked over the tax rate if households take into account the fact that a modication
of the tax rate will have an impact on their consumption. When taxation is based
on housing value, even with pretty simpe utility function such as a Cobb-Douglas
function. Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984) found pretty restrictive conditions on
preferences and on the public good production technology to ensure the existence of
an equilibrium with a competitive land market.
Konishi (1996) found conditions for an equilibrium to exist of the jurisdiction
structure with multiple local public goods produced by rms and nanced by a tax
on wealth, the quantity to produce being determined through Greenberg (1977) d-
majority voting rule. His article raise the problem of the non-convexity of households
consumption set and preference when they can freely move from their jurisdiction to
another one.
Nechyba (1997) developped a model with housing, but contrary to Rose-Ackerman,
housing is modeled as a discreet good, which dier on type, and households own their
house, so wealth is not anymore exogenous, since housing price may vary. In his
model, spillovers between jurisdictions were allowed, because households' utility de-
pends not only on the amount of public good in its jurisdiction and a national public
good, but also on the amounts of public good in all jurisdiction. After having en-
sured the existence of equilibrium under certain conditions, he identied sucient
conditions for a stable jurisdiction structure to be segregated. Unfortunately, one of
these sucient conditions was the absence of spillovers between jurisditions, which is
a pretty strong assumption, that might not be necessary.
Gravel and Thoron (2007) identied a condition that ensure the segregation, in
Westho's sense, of any stable jurisdiction structure : the public good must be, for
all level of prices and income, either always a complement or a substitute to the pri-
vate good. This condition is identied as the Gross Subtitutability/Complementarity
(GSC) condition. This condition implies that, for any level of prices and wealth, the
preferred tax rate will be a monotonous function of the private wealth. Biswas, Gravel
and Oddou (2009) integrated a welfarist central government to the model, whose pur-
2pose is to maximize a generalized utilitarian social welfare function by implementing
an equalization payment policy. Equalization payment can be either vertical (the gov-
ernment taxes households and redistributes the revenues to jurisdictions), horizontal
(the government redistributes local tax revenues between the jurisdictions), or mixed.
They showed that the GSC condition remains necessary and sucient.
The eect of spillovers on the provision of public goods and on the equilibrium
have been analyzed by Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006 and 2006 bis). However, the
authors do not consider the endogenous formation of jurisdiction structure, but only
jurisdiction structure with a xed number of jurisdictions.
In this paper, I generalize Gravel & Thoron's model by assuming that local public
goods may suer from congestion and create spillovers. Households choose a location,
each set of households living in the same place forms a jurisdiction. In each jurisdic-
tion, absenties landlords use the land available in the jurisdiction to produce housing.
The quantity of housing and its price are competitive, so the housing supply is equal
to the housing demand for that price. Then every jurisdiction determines democrati-
cally its tax rate (which is applied to households' wealth), and the revenues generated
by this tax are fully used to nanced a local public good, that may suer of congestion.
Futhermore, households may benet from other jurisdictions' local public good.
This assumption diers from the main part of the literature on local public goods.
However, considering that small towns belonging to a metropolitan area benet from
the public good provided by the main city is not outlandish.
Households are assumed to be freely mobile, so, once all the jurisdictions have
determined its tax rate, households can leave their jurisdiction for another one that
would increase their utility. The equilibrium is reached when no households has
incentive to leave its jurisdiction and to modify its consumption bundle, the housing
price clear the market and the local tax rate are democratic. We assume, as in Gravel
and Oddou (2010), that preferences are :
1. additively separable between the public good on one hand, and the housing and
the wealth available left on the other,
2. restricted homothetic between the housing and the wealth available left condi-
tionally to the amount of public good.
These assumptions, though restrictive, seem to be relevant with respect to recent
data, cf Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2007).
This paper aims to examine the segregative properties of the endogenous juris-
diction structure formation in such a framework. The robustness of the conditions
imposed in Gravel & Oddou (2010) that ensure the segregation of any stable jurisdic-
tion structure is veried.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the formal model.
Section 3 provides an example of how congestion and spillovers can modify a jurisdic-
tion structure. Section 4 states and proves the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The formal model
We consider a model a la Gravel and Thoron (2007), improved by the presence of a
competitive land market, spillovers and congestion. There is a continuum of house-
3holds on the interval [0;1] with Lebesgue measure , where, for any subset I  [0;1],
the mass of household in I is given by (I). The households' wealth distribution is
modeled as a Lebesgue measure ! : [0;1] ! R
+ - household i is endowed with a
wealth !i 2 R
+ - with ! being a increasing and bounded from above function.
Households have identical preferences, represented by a twice dierentiable, in-
creasing and concave utility function U : R3
++ ! R+ :
U(Z;h;m)
1. Z is the available amount of public good households can enjoy
2. h is their amount of housing,
3. m is the amount of the household's expenditure for other things than housing.
All those goods are assumed to be normal.
The utility function is assumed to be additively separable between the public good
on one hand, and the housing and other expenditures on the other hand. The utility
function is additively separable if there exist f : R+ ! R+ and g : R2
+ ! R+, both
twice dierentiable, increasing and concave real valued (with respect to each argument
for g), such that
U(Z;h;m) = f(Z) + g(h;m)
Another property is assumed : conditional homotheticity between housing and
other expenditures. This property implies that the share of their private wealth
households will spend on housing and on other expenditure does not depend on their
private wealth. Under separable additivity, an utility function is homothetic condi-
tional to the public good if and only if 9  : R+ ! R+;  : R2
+ ! R+ such that
 ( (ph;pm)(1   t)!) = max
h;m
g(h;m)
s.t. phh + pmm  (1   t)!i
Each household has to choose a place of residence among all the conceivable lo-
cation. J  N is the nite set of locations, with card(J) = M. Households living at
the same location form a jurisdiction.
Every location j has an amount Lj 2 R
+ of building lands, on which absentee
landlords are able to construct and/or keep in repair a quantity of housing Hj 2 [0;Lj]
they can rent at the competitive gross price pj. Of course, the total housing supply
depends on the price, and the cost function of housing is such that Hj(0) = 0 and
Hj(pj) is strictly increasing with pj.
Since housing is costly, and that households only enjoy the housing that is located in
their own jurisdiction, then, obviously, no household will consume housing in more
than one jurisdiction.
We denote i;j as the measure of households with private wealth !i living in juris-




in the whole area, and nally j as the measure of households living in jurisdiction j.
The amount of public good a household in jurisdiction j can enjoy is given by
Zj = (j;Sj)
with :
4  : R2
+ ! R+ being a non-decreasing (strictly increasing with respect to j,
twice dierenciable, concave function such that 8y 2 R+;(0;y) = 0
 j is the amount of public good produced by jurisdiction j,





where jk 2 R+ represents the spillovers coecient of jurisdiction k's local pub-
lic good in jurisdiction j (exogenously determined).





 tj being the local tax rate,
 $j being the aggregated wealth in j,
 Cj = C(fkgk2J;fkjgk2J) is the congestion function, with C : R2M
+ ! [1;+1[,
continuous and non-decreasing (with respect to every argument).
Assuming that the intensity of the congestion faced by jurisdiction j's public good
because the mass of households in jurisdiction j0 depends on the spillovers coecient
j's ublic good creates in j0 is quite reasonable, since a public good will suer more
from a important mass of households in a jurisdiction that receives a lot of public
good spillovers than from a important mass of households that receive little spillovers.
Moreover, it is assumed that if jurisdiction j's public good creates no spillovers in
jurisiction j0 (i.e. j0j = 0), then the congestion function is constant with respect to
j0. Formally,




However, one could specify the congestion measure in such a way that there would
be no relation between congestion and spillovers coecient. The present denition
of the congestion measure does not exclude such an assumption. The only properties
assumed on the congestion function are that:












The rst property is certainly restrictive, but not unreasonable though, it requires
that the marginal congestion in one jurisdiction generated by a innitesimal increase of
the mass of household, in this very jurisdiction, or another one) tends to be null when
the mass of households is innite. Such a property respect, for instance, homogenous
function of degree less than 1. The second property is more natural since, to some
5extent, the masses of households in dierent jurisdictions are substitutable concerning
the congestion they provide in one jurisdiction. For simplicity, we denote Fj =
$j
Cj as
jurisdiction j's scal potential, that is to say the maximal amount of public good the
jurisdiction can produce (it tj = 1).
The demand for housing and private consumption that a household i has depend
on his disposable income (1 tj)!i and on the housing price in jurisdiction j, pj. We
dened hM(pj;(1 tj)!i;Zj) and mM(pj;(1 tj)!i;Zj) as respectively the Marshal-
lian demand for housing and for wealth of a household i in jurisdiction j, e.g.




pjh + m = (1   tj)!i
.
Under the additive separability assumption, those Marshallian demands do not de-
pend on the amount of public good, that is the reason why, from now, Z will be
withdrawn from the arguments of the Marshallian demands.
The local tax rate is determined according to a democratic rule. Hence, every
household has to determine its favorite tax rate, denoted t : R4
+ ! [0;1], which is a
function of:
 the scal potential F,
 the spillovers from other jurisdictions' public good S
 the housing price p,
 the private wealth !i.
Formally,
t(F;S;p;!i) = argmax
t U((tF;S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);(1   t)!i   phM(p;(1   t)!i))
Lemma 1. If the utility function respects the properties assumed above, then the
utility function is single-peaked with respect to t, so t always exists.
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be obtained easily by dierentiating twice the
utility function with respect to t:


















@R2 = 0. As a consequence, one has:
















Since both U(Z;h;m) and (;S) are concave with respect to all their arguments,
this expression is negative, so the utility function is concave with respect to the tax
rate.
6The indirect utility function conditional to an amount of public good Z, denoted
V C : R3
+ ! R+, depends on the housing price and the net-of-tax wealth, with the
amount of public good as a parameter, and represents the highest possible level of
utility a household can reach. Formally,











as respectively the lowest and the highest tax rate preferred by a household living in
jurisdiction j.
Denition A jurisdiction structure is a triplet S = ((fIjgj2J);(ftjgj2J);(fpjgj2J);(fSjgj2J).
Denition A jurisdiction structure is stable if and only if
1. 8j;j0 2 J;8i 2 Ij;U(Zj;hij;mij)  V (Zj0;pj0;(1   tj0)!i)
2. 8j 2 J;
R
Ij
hM(pj;(1   tj)!i)d = Hj(pj)
3. 8j 2 J;tj 2 [t
j; t
j]
In words, a jurisdiction structure is stable if and only if :
1. No household can increase its utility by modifying its consumption bundle or by
leaving its jurisdiction,
2. The housing prices are competitive in every jurisdiction (supply equals demand)
3. The tax rate is democratically chosen in every jurisdiction.
Let now express formally the denition of the segregation, which is the same
denition as in Westho 1977.
Denition A jurisdiction structure is segregated if and only if 8!h;!i;!k 2 R+
such that !h < !i < !k, (h;k) 2 Ij and i 2 Ij0 ) Zj = Zj0 and 8! 2 R+;V C(Zj;pj;(1 
tj)!) = V C(Zj0;pj0;(1   tj0)!)
In words, a structure jurisdiction is wealth-segregated if, except for groups juris-
dictions that oer same amount of public good and in which every household would
have the same utility in all jurisdictions, the poorest household of a jurisdiction with
a high per capita wealth is (weakly) richer than the richest household in a jurisdiction
with a lower per capita wealth.
Let dene Jj = fk : Zk = Zj and  (pk)(1   tk) =  (pj)(1   tj)g. In words, Jj is
the set of all jurisdictions oering the same amount of available public good as j, and
such that households have the same purchasing power within the meaning of Hicks1.
Obviously, for all j 2 J, households are indierent between all jurisdictions belonging
to Jj.
Formally, a jurisdiction structure is segregated if and only if, when, for all j 2 J,
we dene Jj, the set
S
k2Jj
Ik is a connected set.
12 vectors of prices and income (p1;:::pK;R) and (p0
1;::;p0
K;R0) provide the same purchasing




Let consider the example provided by Gravel & Thoron, improved by the presence of
















Such an utility function is continuous, twice dierentiable, increasing and concave
with respect to every argument. The indirect utility fonction conditional to the public


























Cj (1 + Sj)
Consider an economy with 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 and 3 types of households a;b;c
with private wealth !a = 2 
p




b = 8 and c = 1
30. For simplicity, let assume that the tax rate is determined through
the majority voting rule, and that the housing supply is perfectly elastic with respect
to its price, that will be considered as xed to 1 in both jurisdictions.
For all !i  3+
p
7
2 , the preferred tax rate function is given by
t(F;S;!i) =
!i   2 +
p
(!i   2)2 + 2
2!i
Determining the preferred tax rate function of an households endowed with a private
wealth greater than 3+
p
7
2 will not be required, since households of type c will never
be majoritary in their jurisdiction, so their preferred tax rate will never be applied.
One can observe that the preferred tax rate does not depend on the scal potential,
which will greatly facilitate the example.
Let assume rst that there is no congestion and no spillovers, so C  1 and S  0.
Then, the available amount of public in a jurisdiction j is simply the tax revenue:
Zj = tj$j. Suppose that households of type a and c live in j1, while households of
type b live in j2. Then, in both jurisdiction, the aggregate wealth will be equal to
12, the tax rate in j1, denoted t1, will be equal to 1
2, while t2 = 1
3. Since, at rst,
it is assumed that C1 = C2 = 1 and S1 = S2 = 0, one has Z1 = 6 and Z2 = 4.
Such a jurisdiction structure is stable, since the scal potential is the same in both
jurisdictions, households of type a and b have their favorite tax rate in their respective
jurisdiction, and households of type c are better-o in j1, in which they enjoy an utility
level equal to ln(6) + 15
4  5:54, against ln(4) + 4  5:51 if they would move to j2.

























which will have households of type c moving to j2, in which they will enjoy an utility






16(ln(1;75) 1)  5:424 while their utility level









4  5:402 if they had stayed in j1. Households
of type a and b would not have incentive to move, since households of type a would
enjoy an utility level of approximatively 2:74 in j1 against 2:71 in j2, and households
of type b, an utility level of 4:30 in j2 and 4:09 in j1.
Is the new jurisdiction structure stable after that households of type c had moved
from j1 to j2? Since the preferred tax rate function is constant with respect to the
scal potential, the tax rate will be the same in every jurisdiction. Once households



















so households of type a will get a higher utility level in j1 than in j2 (approximatively
2:73 against 2:71, while households of type b and of type c can enjoy a higher utility
level by staing in j2 than if they moved to j1, respectively with 4:30 against 4:08 for
households of type b and 5:43 against 5:39 for households of type c, so this new struc-
ture is stable and segregated, while the previous one was stable and non-segergated
as long as no congestion eects were assumed. In this very specic example, the
congestion seems to increase the segregative properties of the endogenous jurisdiction
structure formation. Let now introduce spillovers in the example to observe what
impact they can have. Suppose that jurisdiction j1's local public good generates
spillovers in jurisdiction j2, and vice-versa. For instance, suppose that the available









Cl . Since local public goods generate spillovers in other juris-
dictions, it is not unreasonable to assume that the congestion function also depends
on the mass of households in other jurisdictions and on the spillovers coecients. Let
then redene the congestion function as follows:
Ck = 1+
Although j1 produces more public good than j2, suppose that jurisdiction j1



















9hence 12 = 1
3 and 21 = 1
5. With such spillovers coecients, the amounts of public


























So, the available amounts of public good households can enjoy are now









As a consequence, households of type c will move back to j1, in which they will be
able to enjoy an utility level of approximatively 6:17, against 6:10 if they stayed in
j2. Households of type a and b can not increase their utility by voting wth their feet,
since households of type a's utility is about 3:51 in j1 while it would be about 3:38 in
j2, and households of type b have an utility level of approximatively 4:97 in j2 against
4:86 if they moved to j1.
Finally, the jurisdiction structure in which jurisdiction j1 is composed of house-
holds of type a and c, and j2 is composed of households of type b is stable: with
households of type c in j1 instead of j2, the new amounts of public goods produced




























One can observe that, due to the existence of spillovers between jurisdictions, house-
holds of type c's change of jurisdiction has almost no impact on the available amount
of public good in each jurisdiction, then the utility levels will remains almost the same
for all type of households.
As a conclusion, this example suggests that congestion favors the segregative prop-
erties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, whereas the existence of spillovers tends
to decrease the number of stable segergated jurisdiction structures.
However, in the next section, the validity of the GCS condition, that was neces-
sary and sucient to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdiction structure, is
established within the existence of cogestion eect and spillovers.
104 Results
The main result of this paper is the robustness of the Gross Substitutability/Complementarity
condition to the existence of spillovers and congestion eect on the local public goods
to have all stable jurisdiction structures segregated. As in Gravel and Thoron (2007),
this condition is equivalent to the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with
respect to the private wealth, for any given amount of the other arguments. To prove
this equivalence, let rst etablish the following lemma.
Denition Let dene  1(Z;S) : R+ ! R+ as the amount of scal potential needed
to have an available amount of public good Z if the amount of spillovers is S. Formally,
( 1(Z;S);S) = Z
Since (F;S) is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to F,  1(Z;S)
always exists.
























The FOC of the utility maximization program with respect to t implies that:
UZ((tF;S);hM;(1   t)omegai   phM)










Since Marshallian demands are homogenous of degree 0, we can divide all the argu-






















This lemma states that the favorite tax rate function is equivalent to an ane
function of the Marshallian demand for public good. This lemma is used to prove
that the favorite tax rate function is monotonic with respect to the private wealth if
and only if the public good is either always a substitute or always a complement to
the housing and the available wealth (this condition is called the GSC condition).
11Lemma 3. For all utility function that are additively separable between the public good
on one hand and the housing and private consumption on the other, and homothetic
between the housing and the private consumption, the public good is a complement
(resp. a substitute) to the housing if and only if it is also a complement (resp. a
substitute) to the available wealth.
Proof. Under additive separability and restricted homothety assumptions, the indirect
utility function conditional to an amount Z of available public good can be written
as :
V C(Z;ph;pm;y) = f(Z) + g[(ph;pm)(!i   pZZ)]
where ph and pm are respectively the unit price of goods h and m, and !i is the
available income. By denition, the derivative of this expression with respect to Z is
equal to 0 when Z = ZM(pZ;ph;pm;!i) (First order condition), so :
f0(ZM(pZ;ph;pm;!i)) = g0[(ph;pm)(!i   pZZM(pZ;ph;pm;!i)](ph;pm)pZ







g00[(ph;pm)(!i   pZZ)](ph;pm)(R   pZZ) + g0[(ph;pm)(!i   pZZ)]
g00(Z) + g00[(ph;pm)(!i   pZZ)]2(ph;pm)p2
Z













so the public good is a gross substitute (resp. a gross complement) to the housing if
and only if it is also a gross substitute (resp. a gross complement) to the available
wealth.
Lemma 4. The favorite tax rate function is everywhere monotonic with respect to
private wealth if and only if the public good is a gross substitute or a gross complement
to the other good.

































































12Since the public good is assumed to be a normal good (and a fortiori, a non-Gien
good), and since (:) is concave, then (1  
(;S)
F2














The GSC condition is restrictive enough to be discussed, but nevertheless it is not
outlandish. For instance, suppose that the only competence the central government
has transfered to the studied jurisdictions level is social aid. Then, one may assume
that the public good will be a substitute to the two other goods. On the contrary,
if the jurisdiction is competent only in cultural activies, then the public good will
probably be a complement. Suppose now that the jurisdiction is in charge of primary
schools. In this case, the relation between the public good and the other goods is
not trivial, and may vary with respect to the jurisdiction parameters and the private
wealth.
To prove the suciency of the GSC condition, the notion of indierence curve has
to be introduced.
Denition 8(t;u;p;S;!i) 2 [0;1]  R4
+, let dene Fu(u;t;p;S);!i):
U((tf(u;p;t;S;!i);S);hM(Z;p;(1   t)!i);mM(Z;p;(1   t)!i))  u
as the indierence curve of a household with private wealth !i, that is to say the
amount of scal potential the household needs to reach utility u in a jurisdiction with
housing price p, tax rate t and spillovers S.
The assumptions imposed on the utility function and on (:) ensure the existence








(tF;S)MRSu((t  F;S);(1   t)!i)
   F] (7)
The next lemma, that will be used to prove the suciency of the GSC condition
to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated, states that the GSC condition
implies the ordering of the indierence curves slopes with respect to wealth.
Lemma 5.
@f(u;t;p;S;!i)
@t  (resp: )
@f(u;t;p;S;!k)
@t all(t;p;S) 2 [0;1]  R2
+;!i < !k if
the public good is a substitute (resp. a complement) to the two other goods3 .
Proof. The proof is provided for the case of gross complementary, the case of gross
substitutability being symmetric. Assume that the public good is a gross com-
plement to the two other goods. Then, by denition,
@Z
M(pZ;ph;pm;!i
@ph < 0 and
@Z
M(pZ;ph;pm;!i
@pm < 0. Let (t;F;S;p) 2 [0;1]  R4
+ be a certain combination of tax
rate, scal potential, spillovers and housing price and (a;b) 2 R2
+ two amount of











3Actually, the ordering of the indierence curve slopes with respect to the private wealth is




















;1) = (1   t)a
Hence, the Marginal Rate of Substitution between the public good on one hand,
and the housing and the money available for other expenditure on the other hand,
which is a function MRSu(Z;h+m) is equal, at the optimum, to the price ratio, and,
by denition, the chosen bundle respects the budget constraint :
















Let now dene !(b) such that
p
!(b) and 1
!(b) are respectively the highest housing
price and available money price that would allow a household with private wealth 1
to aord the bundle (not necessarly the optimal one) ((tF;S);h;m), with
ph+m
!(b) =
(1 t)b, if the public good price is still 1
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Using the denition of Fu
t given by 7, the implication is etablished.
14This lemma is particularly important to prove the suciency of this article's main
result, which is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any possible economy, every stable jurisdiction structure will be seg-
regated if and only if the public good is either a gross complement or a gross substitute
to the two other goods.
Let begin the proof of this theorem by the suciency of the condition.
Proposition 1. If the GSC condition holds, then every stable jurisdiction structure
is segregated.
Proof. Suppose that there exist 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 with respective parameters
(F1;S1;t1;p1) and (F2;S2;t2;p2) and 3 households with private wealth a;b;c, a < b <
c, such that :
f((t1F1);S1)) + g[(p1)((1   t1)a) > f((t2F2;S2)) + g[(p2)((1   t2)a)
f((t1F1);S1)) + g[(p1)((1   t1)b) < f((t2F2;S2)) + g[(p2)((1   t2)b)
f((t1F1);S1)) + g[(p1)((1   t1)c) > f((t2F2;S2)) + g[(p2)((1   t2)c)
Suppose, with no loss of generality, that p1 > p2.
Consider the hypothetical jurisdiction j0 with parameters (F0;S2;t0;p2) with t0 =
1   (1   t1)
(p1)
(p2) and F0 =  1((F1;S1);S2) Hence, every household is indierent
between j1 and j0, because in both jurisdictions, the amont of available public good
is the same and their purchasing power is the same. Then,
f(Z1) + g[(p0)((1   t0)a) > f(Z2) + g[(p2)((1   t2)a)
f(Z1) + g[(p0)((1   t0)b) < f(Z2) + g[(p2)((1   t2)b)
f(Z1) + g[(p0)((1   t0)c) > f(Z2) + g[(p2)((1   t2)c)
which, according to the lemma 4, is impossible if the GSC condition holds.
Now that the suciency of the GCS condition to have all stable jurisdiction struc-
ture segregated has been proved, the following proposition states that it is also nec-
essary, by showing that any violation of the GCS condition allows to construct a
non-segegated but yet stable jurisdiction structure.
Proposition 2. Every stable jurisdiction structure will be segregated only if the GCS
condition holds.
Proof. Consider an utility function violating the GCS condition for some (F;S;p) 2
R3
+ and some non-dengenerated interval W  R+. Using lemma 3, the monotonicity
of the favorite tax rate function is known to be equivalent to the GSC condition, so we
know for sure that there exist (a;b;c) 2 W3 such that t(F;S;p;a) = t(F;S;p;c) >
t(F;S;p;b) (the proof is the same if the favorite tax rate is increasing and then
decreasing with respect to the private wealth). Then one can always construct a
stable and non-segregated jurisdiction structure. Let create 2 subsets of jurisdictions,
both jurisdictions having a scal potential F, an amount of spillovers S and a housing
price p:
15 jurisdictions belonging to J1 are composed of certain measures a and c of
households endowed with private wealth a and c, and apply a tax rate t1 =
t(F;S;p;a) = t(F;S;p;c)
 jurisdictions belonging to J2 are composed of a certain measure b of households
endowed with private wealth b, and apply a tax rate t2 = t(F;S;p;B).
Such a jurisdiction structure is clearly non-segregated, because the 2 dierent types of
jurisdiction provide dierent amounts of available public good. Moreover, no house-
hold has incentive to leave its jurisdiction, since its favorite tax rate is applied, and
other parameters are the same in all the other jurisdictions. Let's now prove that
there always exist positive measures a;b;c, numbers M1 and M2 of jurisdictions
of respectively type 1 and type 2, a matrix of spillovers coecients and available
amount of housing H1 and H2 such that, in each jurisdiction :
 Spillovers are equal to S,
 Fiscal potential is equal to F,
 Housing price p is competitive.
We dene respectively 1 = t1F and 2 = t2F as the amount of public good produced
by jurisdictions of type 1 and of type 2. For simplicity, jurisdictions in J1 will not
create any spillovers for jurisdictions belonging to J2, and vice-versa. Since the func-
tion S(:) is non-bounded from above, we know that 8 S 2 R+;8( ;  ) 2 R2
+ ;9M :
(M   1)   <  S  M   . In words, for any strictly positive amount of produced
public good and spillovers coecient, by duplicating a jurisdiction a certain number
of times, any amount of spillovers can be bounded from below and from above. Since
S = 0 when the spillovers coecient are null, one can deduc, using the Theorem of
Intermediate Value, that 9 2 [0;  ] : M  =  S As a consequence, we can always
nd (M1;1) and (M2;2) such that
M111) = M222) =  S
Now, let prove that we can always nd a positive measures a;b;c such that, in
each jurisdiction, the scal potential is F. Let consider a jurisdiction j belonging to
J2. This jurisdiction is composed only of households endowed with a private wealth
b. Since all jurisdictions in J2 have the same measure of households and the same
spillovers coecients, the congestion function can be re-written as a function of the
measure of households, the spillovers coecient and the number of jurisdictions in
J2. Let dene CJ2(2;b;M2) = C(fbgj2J2;f2gl2J2). Hence, the scal potential of
this jurisdiction j is Fj =
bb
C(2;b;M2).














Then 8(j;k;k0) 2 J3;8(k;k0) 2 R2
++, and 80





























































Moreover, if the mass of households in a jurisdiction is null, then so is its scal







b;M2) = F. The same reasoning can be applied for jurisdictions in J1,
taking a constant mass of households with private wealth a over mass of households
with private wealth c ratio. We now choose the available amount of housing H1 and
H2 respectively in jurisdictions in J1 and J2 such that the price is competitive, i.e.
H1 = ahM(p;(1   t1)a) + chM(p;(1   t1)c)
H2 = bhM(p;(1   t2)b)
Then, for any violation of the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with
repsect to the private wealth, one can always construct a stable and yet non-segregated
jurisdiction structure.
5 Conclusion
The conclusion of this paper is that neither the congestion nor the existence of
spillovers accross jurisdictions modify the necessity or the suciency of the GCS
condition to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdiction structure in a model
a la Westho.
This condition, which remains valid to the presence of an generalized utilitarian
redistributive central government, seems then quite robust to generalizations of the
model. Searching for a generalization that would make the condition either too weak
or too strong to have all stable jurisdiction structures would be a interesting objective
for further researches.
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